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The current paper reports a field based quasi-experimental study designed to examine the 3 effectiveness of a transformational leadership intervention in remediating poor performance. The 4 intervention was conducted on elements of the organization that senior management perceived as 5 being low performing. 6
Design 7
A quasi-experimental pre-test post-design was employed to evaluate the effectiveness of 8 the transformational leadership intervention. Pre-test data was collected 4 months prior to the 9 intervention starting and the post-test data was collected 8 months after the intervention had 10 started. Follower perceptions of their leader's behavior and group cohesion, together with 11 training outcome data were used to evaluate the effectiveness of the intervention. 12
Findings 13
Results revealed that from pre-test to post-test changes in perceptions of leadership, 14 group cohesion, and training outcome indicated that the intervention had beneficial effects. 15
These beneficial effects were evidenced in one of two ways: desirable behaviors increased in the 16 experimental group from pre-test to post-test whilst they remained the same or were decreased in 17 the control group; or desirable behaviors remained the same in the experimental group whilst 18 they decreased in the control group. 19
Originality 20
The current study is the first to utilize a quasi-experimental organization wide design to 21 examine the efficacy of a transformational leadership intervention. Furthermore, this study 22 provides evidence that transformational leadership can buffer negative environmental effects. 23 Grant and Wall (2009) suggested that quasi-experimental designs are a vastly under-used 12 methodology in organizational research and that they can serve to strengthen causal inferences, 13 minimize ethical dilemmas, and foster constructive collaboration with practitioners. Quasi-14 experimental designs are particularly useful under certain conditions, for example when 15 randomization to treatment condition is not possible or to take advantage of un-controllable 16 environmental events (c.f. Grant & Wall, 2009 ). The current study utilized a quasi-experimental 17 design in which randomization was not possible. Rather, based on the views of the organization's 18 senior management, low performing units were assigned to treatment condition whilst the other 19 half of the organization were used as a control group. The control group served as a measure of 20 external influences upon the organization for the duration of the study, thus protecting against 21 threats to internal validity such as maturation, history, and instrumentation (c.f. Campbell & 22 Stanley, 1963) . Consequently, the extent to which treatment group changes differed in relation to 23 9 Transformational Leadership Intervention changes in the control group from pre-test to post-test was considered an indication of the 1 intervention effects; that is, intervention effects were evidenced by significant group x time 2 interactions. See Figure 1 for an overview of study design. 3
Study Design 11
The intervention was evaluated using a pre-test post-test design. Recruit perceptions of 4 their leader's behavior and perceptions of group cohesion data were collected by taking a cross-5 section of the entire organization in August 2005 (4 months before the intervention started, pre-6 test) and another cross-section of the entire organization in August 2006 (8 months after the 7 intervention had started, post-test). The training outcome data was collected from July to 8
October 2005 (pre-test) and July to October 2006 (post-test) . These dates were selected because 9 the intervention started in January 2006 and, given that training takes 24-26 weeks, the earliest 10 possible time any intervention effects could be detected in terms of "first time" pass rates was 11 therefore July 2006 (24 weeks later). The time period of July to October constitutes a quarter of a 12 year and was thus considered long enough to enable a reliable assessment of pass/fail data to be 13 obtained. By collecting data at the same time of year in each year, the study also controlled for 14 time of year effects. 15
A strength of the study design was that it controlled for the effects of normal staff and 16 recruit turnover. More precisely, the design of the study was such that the units of analysis 17 (recruits) were different in the pre-test and the post-test. This was because training takes 18 approximately 24 weeks to complete, so that the recruits sampled in the pre-test approximately 43% of the focal leaders in this study also changed between the pre-test and the 22 post-test. This is normal turnover for the organization, and the control and experimental groups 23 had similar turnover rates. Whilst, the recruit and leader turnover enabled us to examine the 1 effectiveness of a transformational leadership intervention in normal operating conditions, it also 2 introduced a potential threat to internal validity that relates to experimental mortality. For 3 example, it is possible that environmental factors could have differentially affected recruits 4 and/or staff in the experimental and control groups. This is indeed a serious issue and it is 5 discussed in more detail in the discussion section. 6
Sample 7
The current study was conducted in an Infantry recruit training establishment in 8 the UK. The Infantry recruit training process involves transforming recruits' beliefs, 9
attitudes, values and standards as well as developing their physical fitness and skills. The 10 training is designed to take civilian recruits and develop them into mentally and physically 11 robust soldiers that are able to operate to a very high standard in extremely hostile 12 environments. There are a substantial number of compulsory assessments that need to be 13 passed in order to progress to the next stage of training. At the time of the study, training 14 lasted for either 24 or 26 weeks. However, these are minimum time to pass out and it was 15 not uncommon for recruits to take longer to pass the course. 16 A total sample of 3973 recruits took part in this study. Participant self-report data was 17 provided by n = 1457 recruits (mean age = 19.31; SD = 2.42) and training outcome data was 18 provided by n = 2516 recruits (mean age = 19.42; SD = 2.47). The design of the study was such 19 that the vast majority of participants provided data only for the leadership and group cohesion, or 20 for the training outcome measure. However, 343 participants were common to all data sets; that 21 is, they provided, leadership, self-report, and training outcome data. The sampling window for 22 the training outcome data was 4 months long, and the leadership and attitudinal data were 23 theory and supported them in designing modules to train the section commanders who then 22 trained recruits. The research team also helped the TLAT to adjust the modules for delivery to 23 more senior personnel in the chain of command. Each warrant officer was assigned to work with 1 one divisional company (there were 7 divisional companies in all, 4 in the experimental group 2 and 3 in the control group). The warrant officers were supported in this work by the Major and 3 the research team who provided auxiliary workshops to the chain of command as discussed in 4 the intervention section below. 5
Intervention 6 The research team trained the TLAT via a series of workshops and coaching sessions. 7
The workshops utilized a process that encouraged the TLAT to take ownership of the project. 8
This was achieved by working with a model of equal expertise in which the TLAT's expert 9 knowledge of their (military) area was mapped onto the researchers' expert knowledge of 10 transformational leadership theory. This process involved the research team coaching the TLAT 11 on the theoretical and applied aspects of transformational leadership theory and helping them to 12 identify when and how different transformational leadership behaviors might be utilized. 13
The TLAT and the authors also worked with the chain of command in the divisional 14 companies. This work took the form of a series of group and one to one coaching sessions that 15 were designed to complement the training that the platoon training teams received from the 16
TLAT. 17
Part of the current intervention made use of the vision, support, and challenge model of 18 transformational leadership described in Hardy et al. (2010) . However, it is important to note 19 that at no point did the authors' use of this model supersede the fully differentiated model, it was 20 used only as a teaching aid whereby the different transformational leader behaviors were 21 described as ways in which vision, support, and challenge might be provided (for further details, 22
see Hardy et al. (2010) . 23
The intervention group training teams received four half day interactive workshops from 1 the TLAT on: (1) transformational leadership; (2) vision, support, and challenge; (3) motivation; 2 and (4) coaching skills. The workshops were compulsory for the intervention group with all that 3 group's training teams receiving them. The intervention training teams also received on-going 4 support in the field on how to apply the principles of the workshops to their training context. The 5 control group training teams were offered the above workshops on request, but did not have the 6 option of on-going field support. The control group training teams made very limited use of the 7 optional workshops. It is important to note that high performance expectations was not focused 8 on in the intervention because the level of this behavior was already very high in the 9 organization. 10
Measures 11
Leader Behaviors. Recruits perceptions of their direct leader's behaviors (section 12 commanders) was measured using a leadership scale that was based on the Hardy et al. (2010) 13 measure which was in turn based on the Transformational Leadership Inventory (Podsakoff et 14 al., 1990 ) and the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (Bass & Avolio, 1995) . This measure 15 was chosen because it allows for a contextually relevant differentiated conceptualization of 16 transformational leadership and has been shown to predict training performance in a British 17 military context (Hardy et al., 2010) . Slight modifications were made to the item pool in order to 18 strengthen the measure. Of the original 26 items in the Hardy et al., scale, 9 items were modified 19 and a further 2 items were added. This resulted in a 28 item scale 2 . The factor structure of the 20 rates was that it controlled for differences in first time pass levels that were known to exist; for 1 example, some of the divisional companies traditionally have a lower first time pass rate than 2 other divisional companies because their training is known to be more intense. Examination of 3 the changes in pass rates therefore provided a more accurate measure of the influence that the 4 intervention had on first time and other pass rates. 5
Results 6
Leadership Behaviors 7 A 2 (Group) x 2 (Year) fully randomized MANOVA on the leader behaviors indicated 8 that there were significant main effects for Group F(7, 1447) = 6.01, p < .01, partial n 2 = .03, and 9 year F(7, 1447) = 10.20, p < .01, partial n 2 = .05, together with a significant Group by Year 10 interaction F(7, 1447) = 6.20, p < .01, partial n 2 = .03. Since main effects are superseded by 11 significant interactions, only the multivariate interaction was followed up using univariate 12
ANOVAs. These follow up tests revealed significant interactions for inspirational motivation, 13 Table 2 . 19
The separate univariate significant interactions were followed up using Bonferroni 20 corrected independent samples t-tests. The results suggested that the interactions for inspirational 21 motivation, appropriate role model, fostering acceptance of group goals, intellectual stimulation, 22
and contingent reward were due to the control group significantly decreasing from pre-test to 23 16 Transformational Leadership Intervention post-test, whilst the experimental group did not significantly change from pre-test to post-test; 1 and the interaction for individual consideration was due to the experimental group significantly 2 increasing from pre-test to post-test, whilst the control group did not significantly change form 3 pre-test to post-test. 4
The 2 x 2 randomized ANOVA on the follower perceptions of group task cohesion 5 indicated that there was no main effect for Group or Year but there was a significant Group by 6
Year interaction F(1, 1378) = 16.03; p < .01, partial n 2 = .01 (See Table 2 for means, standard 7 deviations, and F values). Bonferroni corrected independent samples t-tests suggested that the 8 interaction was caused by the experimental group significantly increasing from pre-test to post-9 test, and the control group significantly decreasing from pre-test to post-test. 10
Training Outcome 11
Training Outcome 1 examined 1 st time pass rates relative to 1 st time failure rates, that is, 12 all those recruits that started and finished with the same platoon versus those recruits that started 13 but subsequently failed to complete with that platoon (having been either discharged or moved 14 into another platoon at an earlier stage in training; i.e., "back-squaded"). This statistic provides 15 an indication of the success rates platoons have in passing out recruits that start with them. cohort of recruits as they passed through training. Whilst that design enables an examination of 1 whether specific training teams have been impacted from pre-test to post-test, it does not enable 2 conclusions to be drawn about the feasibility of organizational change. Since the sampling 3 procedure used in the current study examined a cross section of the entire organization at two 4 different time points between which there was considerable organizational turnover in both 5 leaders and recruits, the conclusions that can be drawn from it are importantly different to those 6 that can be drawn from the Dvir et al., and Hardy et al., studies. More precisely, the present 7 intervention has been shown to have an effect at an organizational level not just at the level of 8 specific training teams. This is an important addition to the literature because interventions have 9 generally examined the effects of transformational leadership in stable conditions where the 10 participants and leaders remain constant. However, the current intervention took place in a 11 dynamic context whereby normal organizational changes occurred to both the control and 12 experimental groups. This suggests that transformational leadership interventions can not only 13 affect less dynamic organizations where there is a small amount of turnover but can also affect 14 organizations where there is a relatively large turnover. This effect may, at least partially, be due 15 to the way in which the intervention was designed and delivered by individuals from within the 16 organization (key influencers). It may also have been influenced by the fact that the intervention 17 included on-going support to training teams and the chain of command on a regular basis. 18
Indeed, this aspect of the intervention may be a possible solution to the problem highlighted by 19 that leadership training needs to incorporate a sustainable approach 20 that can be worked into leaders' daily routines. It is suggested that having an in house support 21 mechanism in the form of ongoing field support is one such system that may help to foster long 22 term sustainable change. Indeed, as a result of the current study the organization has imbedded 23 the Training and Leadership Advisory Team into the normal operating procedures of the 1 organization by creating new posts to fulfill these roles (as of 2012). 2
The results of the current study provide some quasi-experimental evidence that supports 3 previous correlational studies (e.g., Bass et al., 2003; Callow, Smith, Hardy, Arthur, & Hardy, 4 2009; Lim & Ployhart, 2004; Schaubroeck et al., 2007 ) that transformational leadership is 5 important in predicting group process variables such as group cohesion. It is somewhat 6 surprising, given that transformational leadership has been frequently theorized to have its most 7 important impact on group processes that, to the best of the current authors' knowledge, no field 8
based experimental study has directly tested this proposition. Whilst the current study did 9 attempted to examine a group process variable using a field based experimental design we only 10 used a relatively narrow aspect of group processes. Future experimental research should seek to 11 include a wider range of group processes such as, group potency, collective efficacy, and group 12 role variables. 13
At an applied level, one of the long term aims of the study was to embed within the 14 organization a group of key influencers who could support their colleagues in helping them to 15 become more transformational. The results suggest that embedding this kind of support 16 mechanism into the organization might benefit to the long term performance of the organization. 17
The financial benefits of this type of mechanism, given the increase in first time pass rates and 18 remedial pass rates, would appear to be highly beneficial to the organization. When the cost of 19 training recruits is factored against the cost of employing the key individuals the financial 20 benefits become starkly apparent. However, more research is clearly necessary to examine this 21 speculation. 22
The current study sought to maximize external validity by trying to emulate normal 1 organizational operating procedures as closely as possible (i.e., the high rate of staff turnover in 2 the current organization). However, the process of maximizing external validity can sometimes 3 be at the expense of internal validity (Campbell & Stanley, 1963) . For example, in the current 4 study organizational changes may have been different for the control and experimental groups 5 and it maybe these changes that could be an alternative explanation of the results. However, 6 there is no reason to believe that changes in the organization (e.g., placement of recruits, quality 7 of recruits, placement of trainers, resource allocation etc.) or changes in the wider environment 8 (e.g., negative publicity, unpopular wars, difficulties in recruiting) would have been different for 9 either of the groups over the course of the study. Indeed, when designing the study, we checked 10 with the senior management whether there were likely to be any changes to specific parts of the 11 organization that would impact the results. We also made checks during the study. It was the 12 opinion of the senior management, that whilst recruitment was becoming increasingly difficult, 13 these difficulties were apparent across the whole organization. The authors believe that the most 14 parsimonious explanation of the results remains that the observed differences in the experimental 15 and control groups for the duration of the study were as a result of the transformational 16 leadership training, none the less, we cannot rule out alternative explanations. 17
Theoretically, the observed effects in the current study could also have been caused by a 18 negative Hawthorne effect, as evidenced by the decrease in many of the control group variables. 19
That is, the control group performed more poorly because they thought the experimental group 20 was receiving special treatment. However, this is unlikely to be the case because the organization 21 under study ensures that employees at all levels frequently receive training courses in the context 22 of which the current study was probably perceived as being "just another training course." 23 22 Transformational Leadership Intervention Interestingly, Dvir et al. (2002) noted a similar argument in their study (which was conducted in 1 a similar military context to the present study) regarding the fact that only the experimental 2 group received booster sessions in their study. Moreover, the control group training teams in the 3 present study were offered the workshops that the experimental group received, so they could 4 have had the same "special" treatment if they had wanted it. However, there was only a very 5 limited uptake of this offer. Thus, it is unlikely that the negative effects observed in the control 6 group were not negative Hawthorne effects, but were due to the wider organizational factors 7 discussed earlier, none the less we cannot rule out this possibility either. 8
In conclusion, with the above caveats in mind, the current study demonstrated that an 9 intervention underpinned by transformational leadership can positively impact the organizational 10 climate and organizational efficiency in a military setting. Furthermore, and of particular salience 11 to the current economic climate is the finding that transformational leadership interventions 12 appear to be able to enhance the performance of low performing groups and offset negative 13 changes in the organizational climate. 14 e., all those recruits that successfully completed training with the platoon they started with, vs. the recruits that were failed out of the platoon that they started with during the data capture window. N.B. Different divisional companies have traditionally different pass rates, therefore the result of interest is the change in pass rates rather than absolute level of pass rate. 
